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1. Introduction 
Globalisation is increasingly analysed as an historic phenomenon; it has a history, and it is a 
phenomenon that is capable of making and shaping history. This article attempts to contribute to a 
broadening of the globalisation research agenda by analysing the ideology of domination and control 
over the natural environment, one of the fundamental ideological underpinnings of our current global 
transformation, in a historical perspective. The paper serves two purposes. First, by analysing the 
history of fundamental ideologies such as the domination of nature, this article places current social 
practices within the larger framework of historic dynamics of globalisation. Second, by analysing the 
ideological underpinnings of global transformations, it sheds light on the co-construction of social 
order through the development of material and ideational realms. Alternative approaches towards 
globalisation research should include analysis of the ideology of "mastery" over nature. The 
perspective chosen in this article can be characterised as historical political ecology, because it centres 
on a critical assessment of the interaction of political, social and environmental variables in a historic 
perspective (cf. Greenberg and Park 1994), in this case offering comparison between Europe and 
China. 
"Breathless and fragmented, the world rushes into the new millennium". This is the message 
that the German Advisory Council for Global Environmental Change (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat der 
Bundesregierung Globale Umweltveränderungen, WBGU) places at the beginning of its annual 
assessment for the year 2000 (2001: 13). And indeed, the state of the world’s environment is 
represented as one of constant crisis and turmoil, despite the plethora of environmental regimes and 
organizations working towards the amelioration of this crisis. Total global fossil fuel consumption 
(coal, oil and natural gas) rose to a new peak of 7,956 million metric tons of oil equivalent in 2001. 
Carbon dioxide emissions reached 6,553 million tons in 2001, amounting to a record concentration of 
384 ppm carbon dioxide in the atmosphere (measured at the Mauna Loa Observatory, Hawaii, 2007). 
The capacity of the 436 nuclear reactors operating in over 35 countries has reached 351 gigawatts and 
the economic mega-machine on which all these achievements rest, produced a record annual gross 
world product of US $40.5 trillion in 1999 (1998 prices). The flipside of this steady economic growth 
is a global environment deteriorating at an accelerating rate, and human societies suffering continuing 
violent upheavals. There were over 150 major and minor armed conflicts between 1990 and 2000.1
Over the course of human history, humankind’s impact on its natural environment has 
magnified, including its ability to alter, shape and reshape nature, its abilities to dominate the global 
environment in all its forms and to construct it according to its own needs. The ideology that provides 
for this unprecedented enterprise – the mastery of nature – is of European origin, although today it is 
shared by almost every society on earth, through the subtle effects of globalisation.  
This article tries to answer the question why Europe developed an ideology of conquest and 
domination towards nature and how it achieved the necessary technologies, tools, mentalities, beliefs, 
institutions and mental frameworks to put this ideology into practice. Why was Europe, a backward 
region of civilisation up to the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance, able and willing to follow this 
destructive path with such stubbornness and ingenuity? My ambition in this respect is rather modest. 
Instead of offering a detailed historical account of the relation between nature and society, I provide a 
summary of the main trends and issues. This short paper offers a broad and schematic account of 
European relations to nature, and an interpretation of large-scale historic developments. 
The article is organised as follows: section two discusses the difficult relation between 
humans and their environment, and some features of the historic impacts of human actions. The third 
section aims at analysing, in a comparative approach, the different parameters that shaped European 
and Chinese relations towards their natural environment: pre-1500 climate, geography, population, 
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agriculture, society and culture.2  The fourth section focuses on Europe’s "step ahead" from China and 
other civilizations between 1450-1750, and tries to identify the forces that shaped the ideology of 
"mastery": institutions including the state, the Church, science, capitalism, and events that included 
scientific discoveries and the Reformation. I conclude with a brief summary of the argument. 
 
2. The Ideology of Domination: Concepts and Symptoms 
Humans have always shaped and altered their natural environment.3 The hunting and gath-
ering activities of tribal societies, agriculture and the domestication of animals in post-Neolithic socie-
ties, the construction of the grand canal in classical China, or the ceremonial buildings of Meso-
American cultures, are different examples of the anthropogenic shaping and control of nature in 
different historical epochs. The driving force behind most of these actions has simply been the ne-
cessity to meet basic needs for food, clothing, housing and to express spiritual beliefs, under the con-
straint of a steadily growing population (Ponting 1991: 141). Homo sapiens sapiens is the only species 
that has erected a "second nature" that we term "culture", by an evolving, and eventually decisive 
alienation of society from the natural environment as part of evolution.4 Whether the extensive 
shaping of natural environments has been a function of "natural evolution", or an artificial "super-
evolution" is an intriguing debate. The ways in which human beings have constructed their relation to 
the surrounding world are simultaneously responsible for, as well as serving to legitimize, human 
impacts on global ecosystems.5
The ideology that underpins human mastery and domination over nature is a relative late 
achievement and, as I will argue, of European origin.6 It has developed in the period of Europe’s "step 
ahead" from 1450-1750, closely connected to and mutually influencing the rise of capitalism, the 
formation of the early modern territorial state, the waning influence of religious dogma, and the 
emergence of scientific worldviews and discoveries. The "age of discoveries" provided for its world-
wide application through travel and exploration, and the French Revolution at the end of the 18th 
century was a powerful force in the rise of homo economicus and the Industrial Revolution. The 
ideology of domination "was elevated to the status of a conscious principle for the orientation of 
human behaviour" (Leiss 1974: xii). It reinforced the separation of society (the sphere of development 
and meaning), from "nature". The scientific method, emergent in the 17th century, combined an 
aspiration for a better understanding of "the laws of nature" with the promise of substantial social 
benefits. The long term effects of this growing scientific understanding of nature were the continued 
success of scientific discoveries and their technological applications, and an ability to apply 
technological innovation to mass production, offering hope for the elimination of human misery and 
social disorder (Leiss 1974: 19). The ideology of the mastery of nature was not simply a function of 
science and applied technology aided by the economic expansion and political stabilisation of Europe 
after 1450. It was also the overarching intellectual concept of several discrete or overlapping European 
cultures that were, at varying speeds and scales, heading towards world domination. 
Scientific advance and economic expansion was not confined to European space. They 
rapidly manifested themselves in places as remote as Siberia and Terra del Fuego. Three different pat-
terns of ecological devastation are most visible in the period between 1450 and 1750. First, there were 
species extinctions brought about by overexploitation to meet a growing European market for goods 
like fur, whale oil and fish. Second, the expansion of the financial system in Europe was responsible in 
part for the spread of mining activities and advances in hydraulic engineering that had a detrimental 
effect on the environment. Third, as Crosby (1986) notes, new species were transported and introduced 
to the ecosystems of the New World and later to other emergent colonial outposts along with European 
migration, enabled by safer and more reliable ocean transport.7
                                                             
2  China serves as a comparative case because it seemed to possess the necessary conditions for becoming 
the dominant world civilisation around 1400 but lost its leadership role to Europe (see later discussion). 
3  For a detailed account of the human impact on the environment, see Andrew Goudie (2000). 
4  By this reading, I do not imply that non-human animals possess no form of social organization (includ-
ing the ability to learn and to communicate). 
5  Franz Broswimmer (2001) has coined the term "ecocide" for this destructive process, which dates back 
more than 5000 years. In a similar vein, Chew (2001) argues that the human belief in "exploiting" nature is of a 
longer duration and has been even more destructive than is frequently acknowledged. 
6  This focus on Europe as a driving force in the development and application of a specific ideology of 
domination should not be equated with unreflexive Eurocentrism. 
7  Crosby (1986) uses the term Ecological Imperialism to describe the biological expansion of old world 
species to the new colonies. 
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In Europe, the extinction or severe impact on species has a long history. The constant need for 
an extension of arable land to feed a growing population cut into relatively undisturbed habitats, and 
drove the frontier of European agricultural and pastoral civilisation further and further into the tem-
perate and boreal forests of Central and Eastern Europe. The wolf, the European bison, and the au-
rochs (the ancestors of modern cattle), were all driven to extinction, or remained only in isolated 
populations. By the 15th and 16th centuries, state policies tried to limit the negative effects of predator 
animals and birds on agriculture, by giving incentives to hunters and trappers (Ponting 1991: 164).8  
Hunting as a "sport" has also contributed to the extent and variety of European wildlife. But it was the 
discovery of the New World and the newly-won ability to travel by fast, safe, and affordable ocean 
transport that extended the reach of European market demand for goods like fur, fish and whale oil and 
sanctioned killing on a massive scale. Exploitation continued at an accelerating pace across the global 
commons – in the oceans, and the plains and steppes of newly-colonised overseas territories. Hardin's 
"tragedy of the commons" argument has some analytical value here (Hardin 1968), as short-term 
maximum returns from whaling and the hunting of buffalo in North America were almost completely 
unregulated. 
As the modern banking system began to spread beyond its Italian origins in the early 15th 
century, a sophisticated finance system emerged in Europe that provided the resources needed to 
engage in capital-intensive mining operations.9 From 1450 "mining, especially in central Europe, 
entered an age of progress unlike anything ever seen before" (Mokyr 1990: 63). This newly emerging 
form of capitalism went hand in hand with innovations in hydraulic engineering and smelting, which 
increased the rate of exploitation in the sector. The second great achievement of the early Renaissance 
period in applying its control over nature was in canal building, and especially in large-scale publicly 
funded drainage programmes  that altered the landscape profoundly (Forbes 1958: 157). 
The most devastating interference in the biosphere, however, was the ecological disaster 
caused by the introduction of exotic species to virgin environments outside Europe, disrupting natural 
equilibria and exterminating many native species, plants and animals alike. "Increased commu-
nications between different parts of the world also resulted in the spread of plant diseases and pests" 
(Ponting 1991: 175). Under the threat of exotic intruders, native plants quickly gave way to a wide 
variety of Eurasian species and this also paved the way for the success of European and Middle-
Eastern livestock (Crosby 1986: 145-170). This "ecological imperialism" illustrates another basic as-
pect of the ideology of domination: its connectedness to the domination by Europeans of other hu-
mans, as part of the territorial expansion of the major European powers. As Leiss (1974: 16) points 
out, "human activity becomes so much a part of the natural environment that mastery of nature and 
mastery of man are only two aspects of the same process". The maintenance of the Europeanised 
human ecologies of the New World would have been impossible without slave labour. The "rape of the 
world" (Ponting 1991: 161-192) preceded, and was co-determinous with, the exploitation of other 
cultures. 
 
3. Prerequisites for Change: Comparing Europe and China 
A puzzle that has occupied many thinkers, from Wolf to Braudel, is why Europe developed 
the necessary technologies, institutions and mental dispositions to dominate nature, over and above 
other civilizations. Europe was a cultural backwater until the end of the Middle Ages consisting of 
isolated and warring city-states and territories, and yet Western Europe then experienced a rapid take 
off. By comparison China, the most advanced civilization at this time, entered a phase of stagnation. 
Islamic civilization, formerly influential as far as southern Europe, had already declined in power by 
the 1400s.10 This problematic may be understood through an examination of geography, politics and 
culture. 
According to Jones, Europe’s advantage in comparison with China was its "ecological indi-
viduality". The contributing factors here were the presence of fewer and less devastating diseases due 
to relatively harsh winters, and the early development of ploughing technology (Jones 1987: 6). In 
addition, fewer natural disasters, like droughts and earthquakes, affected Europe than in other world 
regions (despite, of course, the presence of tectonic instability in Mediterranean that had affected the 
Greek and Roman empires). Favourable conditions made it possible for peasant farmers to apply a K-
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8  An Act passed by the English Parliament in 1533 included foxes, polecats, weasels, stoats, otters, hedge-
hogs, rats, mice, moles, hawks, buzzards, ospreys, jays, raven and kingfishers in the list of unwanted animals. 
9  For example, the Fugger’s financial empire was built on mining activities in Hungary (cf. Rice and 
Grafton 1994: 52). 
10  Compared to the China, the Islamic civilisation that influenced Europe so profoundly in the period be-
tween 1100 and 1400 was a borrower and chronist, but not so much an original inventor. 
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strategy11 of population growth, controlling fertility by marriage restrictions and thus improving hu-
man capital (Jones 1987: 16). The greater frequency of natural disasters in China meant more 
uncertainty and risk, working against long-term investment. The capital-labour ratio in Europe 
"offered better protection for capital goods than for labour" than in China (Jones 1987: 39). 
Political catastrophes like invasions and warfare also had a negative impact on capital 
investment. Western Europe’s geographic location, a peninsula at the end of the vast Eurasian 
landmass, and its resulting seaward perspective were substantially different from China’s landward 
orientation and its openness to the steppes of central Asia and their hostile cultures. Europe’s 
relationship with the sea was instrumental in its emergence as a conquering civilisation, while China’s 
maritime expeditions were more limited and considered a luxury in the context of imminent 
continental invasion. 
Another explanation for Europe’s relative advanced position in 1500 was its distinctive food 
regimes. Chinese aquatic rice production differed from the European agrarian system based around 
wheat, in its political, cultural, and economic consequences. The highly labour intensive paddy-field 
system required an enormous amount of labour and knowledge, tending towards (with some 
exceptions) a stable society, and state authority overseeing large-scale agrarian projects (Braudel 1982: 
149). The result was a food regime that supported a strict social discipline and very limited social 
mobility. The high yields of rice agriculture permitted population growth, allowing more labour to be 
invested in intensive rice production, without exaggerating social stratification. In contrast, Europe 
went down a distinctively different path. The relatively small energy surplus of European agriculture 
was not so much directed towards population growth as towards livestock husbandry. The decision to 
favour animal protein over plant protein was decisive. In contrast to China’s socially disciplined 
society and its large-scale works, Europe experienced social diversification among smallholders (see 
Netting 1993), and continuous competition for the production destined for an emerging market 
economy. 
The same line of argument can be applied in the political arena. The competitiveness of the 
emerging European state system supported technological innovation and set the stage for the era of 
early capitalism. The contemporaneous ending of external shocks such as the Plague and the waning of 
feudalism in the 15th century are of enormous importance for the political development of Europe 
(Jones 1987: 51). As monetary relations in markets replaced feudal ties, and the concept of individual 
property rights took hold within an emerging structure of general laws and practices, investments and 
long-distance trade became less risky. In sharp contrast, China’s political organization was the empire. 
With its centralized decision-making processes the empire could easily obstruct important 
achievements, such as maritime expeditions. By the end of the 14th century China possessed all the 
necessary technological requirements to engage in long-distant ocean transport, but despite the 
impressive accounts on the great commercial expeditions to the Indian Ocean between 1405 and 1433 
– involving 250 vessels and thousands of men – the whole enterprise was abandoned by a single 
decision of the Imperial court (McNeill 1963: 526). 
Officials and the landed interests proved superior against a weak and underdeveloped 
merchant class. China’s bureaucratic feudalism, based on a class of civil servants, the Mandarinate, 
was the distinctive organizational feature of the Chinese political-administrative system. The 
Mandarins, the keepers of order, successfully checked and balanced the development of capitalism and 
maintained the unity of a vast empire against feudal lords, merchants, craftsmen, and peasants. In this 
way they were responsible for China’s social immobility (Braudel 1993: 190). As Needham observes, 
"[a] predominantly mercantile order of society could never arise in Chinese civilisation because the 
basic conception of the Mandarinate was opposed not only to the principles of hereditary aristocratic 
feudalism but also to the value-system of the wealthy merchants" (Needham 1969: 197). After the end 
of the Mongol dynasty and its short-lived re-concentration on trade, the feudal-bureaucratic class was 
successful in reasserting the "fundamental Confucian principle, which classified merchants among the 
necessary evils of society" (McNeill 1963: 127). China's centralized empire and its powerful class of 
civil servants produced a political and economic immobility, while Europe was maturing as a region of 
competition and innovation. 
The third context that may explain the different performance of Europe and China in regards 
to their economic and political-administrative developments, and subsequently their attitude towards 
nature, is cultural and philosophical. Social leadership depended on, according to the Confucian prin-
ciples, learning and moral excellence, but not wealth (McNeill 1963:529). Upward social mobility was 
therefore based on educational achievement and was thus rather limited in scope compared to the post-
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feudal environment in Europe, where the emerging territorial state, and its need for loyal servants, 
provided mobility. 
Another explanation for the different paths Europe and China took after 1500 can be found in 
their radically opposed concepts of the laws governing nature. The idea that there were universal Laws 
of Nature that could be studied and predicted took hold in European philosophical tradition in the early 
14th century, after the death of Roger Bacon. The Chinese Taoist tradition, on the contrary, failed to 
develop anything resembling Laws of Nature because of a mistrust of reason and logic: "With their 
appreciation of relativism and the subtlety and immensity of the universe, they were groping an Ein-
steinian world-picture without having laid the foundations for a Newtonian one. By this path science 
could not develop" (Needham 1969: 311). This was the scientific framework that operated in China, 
while Europe was crossing the threshold to the scientific revolution of Humanism, the Renaissance, 
and prepared for its "great step ahead". 
 
4. Domination and Control: Europe’s step ahead between 1450 and 1750 
Between 1450 and 1750 Europe acquired all the necessary technological, institutional and 
conceptual elements to develop its unique ideology of domination and control over the natural 
environment. This process may be analysed within four different contexts: first, the emerging early 
modern state; second, the legacy of the Judaeo-Christian tradition; third, the Scientific Revolution of 
the 17th century; and finally the rise of early capitalism. Framed by the impacts of the Age of 
Discoveries and the end of a monolithic metaphysical explanatory structure caused by the onset of the 
Reformation, these interconnected institutions set the stage for the emergence of domination and 
control of nature as an integral part of European early modern culture. 
The first decisive development in the context of the early modern state is the process of ad-
ministrative concentration that took place between the mid 15th and mid 16th centuries. The balance of 
loyalties that had characterised feudalism shifted in favour of the Crown. It was during the same 
period that the "sovereign Prince" was widely appreciated as an absolute ruler, limited only by divine 
and natural law. Based on a new class of loyal servants that were no longer bound to the King by 
feudal ties but, rather, attracted by the promise of wealth and influence, the centralization of power 
helped to give birth to the early modern state. It was characterized by a standing army, an efficient bu-
reaucracy, and the harmonisation of competing laws and standards. This created a framework of 
security that fostered capitalist development in the new territorial states, and thus increased the 
resource base on which state-building was based. As a result, power and control over financial, human, 
and natural resources vastly improved compared to Feudal times. The ideology of domination 
flourished within an institutional environment that was no longer based on a horizontal distribution of 
power, but on a vertical mechanism of command and control. 
The domestic process of administrational concentration was accompanied by the formation of 
a competitive early modern state system, which also proved to be the ideal organizational structure for 
the rise of scientific and technological progress. Like a system of cells that influence and regulate each 
other in mutual ways (Jones 1987: 126) the European state system generated a momentum of techno-
logical innovation through a process of diffusion that would have been impossible under a less com-
petitive institutional arrangement. It was precisely this European "genetic diversity" that proved supe-
rior over other political formations. Under these conditions the impact of war and other major catastro-
phes was lessened, and as trade continued through varying channels, economic development could not 
be restricted as easily as had been in centralized empires and civilizations. The competitive arrange-
ment of the European state system and its dynamic consequences was the breeding ground for linear 
progress, which came to characterize European history and which shaped it so fundamentally. 
The profound influence of a Judeo-Christian tradition on the western perception of nature was 
noted early in the debate about the causes of environmental degradation. Lynn White argues "the 
present increasing disruption of the global environment is the product of a dynamic technology and 
science which […] cannot be understood historically apart from distinctive attitudes toward nature 
which are deeply grounded in Christian dogma" (White 1967). The Bible seems to indicate in various 
passages that nature was designed to meet human needs exclusively. The spirit is separated from 
nature and what matters is the individual relationship between God the creator and humans as his 
superior creatures. Unlike Animism, where nature itself is worshiped and praised, Christian belief 
segregates the sphere of sacredness from the natural environment, thus assigning it to the level of a 
supportive structure. The story of Creation is essentially a story of authorisation and legitimation. God 
transfers his unlimited authority over all the living creatures of the world to Man, making him the 
"Lord of nature". Since the time of the Renaissance this was, arguably, perceived as a political 
empowerment of the individual and it supported the concept of the King as an absolute ruler, le-
gitimised by divine authority. 
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The spread of Judeo-Christian culture into environments substantially different from its place 
of origin – the deserts and semi-arid zone of Palestine, for example – has also contributed to the 
dominant ideology of human-nature relations. As the simple and hostile environment of the Judeo-
Christian birthplace was abandoned for the more complex and resource-rich environment of northern 
Europe, without changing the basic perception of nature as an enemy to be defeated, the ideology of 
mastery over nature spread to regions where it could do substantial harm.12
But despite the many religious justifications of human authority over the earth and its crea-
tures, Man did not perceive himself as an absolute ruler, but as God’s loyal servant. As nature was 
God’s creation, it was deemed sacred, and thus protected against destruction to a certain degree. It was 
only after secularisation took hold in Europe following the Reformation, that this safety valve broke 
down and allowed for the full-scale application of the disastrous ideology of control (Leiss 1974: 34). 
The Renaissance freed the mindset of domination from the limitations of religious dogma, but it failed 
to provide for a new ethic capable of regulating the relation between humankind and nature in the 
absence of a religious justification for the "rape of the earth". But the ties between God and nature 
were not entirely disconnected, because science took over the role of explaining human existence. 
Until the end of the 18th century nearly every great scientist was preoccupied with religious problems, 
perceiving nature as the manifestation of the "grand clockmaker", God. 
The work of Francis Bacon is an illuminating example of the embeddedness of scientific 
progress and the domination of nature in a religious context. "By casting his plea for scientific pro-
gress in a familiar religious mold, he managed to win wide acceptance for a novel conception of mas-
tery over nature, and at the same time he unwittingly charted a course for later generations which led 
to the gradual secularisation of this idea" (Leiss 1974: 53). It was Bacon's achievement in formulating 
the concept of mastery over nature as a new scientific and practical enterprise (Russell 1961: 527). 
René Descartes’ contribution to the development of modern science contains the deterministic seg-
regation of mind and matter and the method of reductionism that led to a purely mechanistic world-
view. This approach to scientific enquiry "inevitably led to a fragmented view of the world – to a focus 
on the individual parts of a system rather than on the organic whole, on studying the way in which the 
constituent elements operated separately rather than the ways in which they interacted" (Ponting 1991: 
147). This resulted in the perception of humans and nature as governed strictly by the laws of physics, 
and thus it favoured the exploitation of the one by the other. It was Isaac Newton at the end of this 
essential phase of scientific development who transcended all these efforts by formulating an abstract 
and geometrised universe that was governed by the one fundamental principle of gravitation (Braudel 
1993: 368). This substantial achievement enabled future generations of scientists to systemise the 
forces of nature into an abstract set of basic principles and rules, which resulted in a radical alienation 
of western civilisation from the notion of nature as a complex and mystical entity.13
Triggered by these rapid developments in science, a powerful new concept emerged on the 
stage of 17th century Europe, the idea of progress.14  In strong contradiction to the classical concep-
tions of history as a constant gradual decline from a Golden Age, and to the Christian concept of 
history as a transitional phase between the creation of the world and the final judgement, the "early 
modern" view was one of continual improvement towards the full domination of nature by humankind 
(Ponting 1991: 150). It is in the ideas of Marx and Engels that the concept of inevitable progress of the 
human society has found its most influential manifestation. 
The fourth substantial institution that contributed to the rise of the ideology of control and 
mastery over nature was the rise of early capitalism, prefigured by the Reformation and the rise of 
scientific discovery. Early capitalism – understood in contrast to the craft mode of production – splits 
the single class of artisans into two distinct social groups: entrepreneurs who own and control capital 
on the one hand, and waged workers on the other. By 1560 "the cleavage between capital and labour, 
which is – like scientific method and an art based on perspective – a unique peculiarity of western 
civilisation, was firmly and widely established in many parts of industrial Europe" (Rice and Grafton 
1994: 60). But it was still the state who dominated early modern capitalism and who held the 
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12  For a more detailed account on the relation between the environment and the development of religion see 
Huntington (1972: 276-327). 
13  However, the development of mechanistic science and the scientific Revolution of the 16th and 17th 
century were by no means linear. For example, the emerging discipline of botanics was initially characterised by 
its focus on utility (e.g. in the search for new herbal treatments), but developed into a less utility-oriented science 
during the 16th century. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this observation.    
14  For a more detailed account on the history of progress in the period of the great renewal (1560-1740), 
see Nisbet (1980: 118-170). 
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institutional and financial powers to implement the new mode of production on a large scale.15 Its in-
creasing demand for capital created the environment for broad private lending structures that 
profoundly influenced the development of early capitalism. This triggered the further consolidation of 
a highly influential merchant class, and its connected trade system, that developed rapidly in scale and 
scope and can be considered global by the late 16th century. 
The decisive new feature was not trade in itself, but the brutal pillage of the Americas that 
resulted in the accumulation of precious metals and the production of new value through cultivation of 
export crops (Beaud 2001). The developing trade in sugar and rum, which was based on a system of 
slave and forced labour, is an illustrative example of the very nature of the new ideology of 
domination that had enlarged its scope of application tremendously through exploration and 
colonisation. 
The impact of this unique event has been twofold as far as our topic is concerned:  First, the 
European economy became a European world economy16 (Wallerstein 1986: 447-514) and second, the 
discoveries served as an empty map for the collective imagination of Europe. The size of the New 
World and its abundant flora and fauna, which impressed the first explorers so profoundly, served as 
an imaginative space for Europe’s expansion, having a substantial impact on the way in which the 
early Conquistas and settlers perceived their possibilities, both in regards to the land and the people. 
The enlargement of Europe’s perspective relieved western culture of the disturbing necessity to 
confront itself with the growing degradation caused by its own distinct ideology of domination. The 
conquest was not only material and economic, but also mental in nature. The metaphor of the empty 
map can as well be utilised to describe the developments in science and technology: As religion lost its 
integrating power and the societal forces began to gravitate towards the edges it was the new scientific 
enterprise that provided an empty imaginative space for the collective hopes of Europe.  
It was the Reformation, the second event exercising substantial influence on early modern 
times that induced this secular transition. But its impact goes far beyond this. There has been criticism 
of Max Weber’s evocation of the Protestant Ethic as underlying the rise of capitalism, but the impact 
of the Reformation on economic development and competition in Europe after 1550 cannot be 
doubted. The recollection of the text as the central religious authority in Protestantism, and the rein-
statement of Papal authority through the Jesuit order in Catholicism, did not halt the gradual process of 
secularisation, but it did provide yet another hidden authoritarian layer in European culture. 
The slow development of capitalism – framed by the discoveries and the process of seculari-
sation – did not reach its mature form, where surplus value was systematically extorted, until the end 
of the 18th century (Beaud 2001). But it resulted in the enrichment of the bourgeoisie of Europe who 
became the agents of the fundamental change that altered Europe’s face so profoundly, the French 
Revolution. As Herbert Muller phrased it, the "French Revolution brings us closer to the Industrial 
Revolution […] as not only a political but a social revolution, ending once and for all the old aristo-
cratic order with its feudal privileges, it marked the ascendancy of the bourgeoisie, who had taken 
charge of it" (Muller 1971: 42). The "new man" of the French Revolution is the true agent of the ideol-
ogy of domination over nature, taking the decisive step towards industrialization and the finally the 
age of "post-historic man" (Mumford 1956: 154-176). 
 
5. Conclusion 
The ideology of domination over nature is still with us today; indeed it has submerged to 
deeper layers of consciousness, not only in western civilisation, but also to almost every culture on 
earth. Deeply rooted in our every-day beliefs, actions, reflections and hopes, it lies at the centre of any 
attempt to transform the world into a more loveable, friendlier, lighter and safer place. The 
enslavement of nature and the subsequent enslavement of humans by other humans has led to a global 
state of affairs that is neither morally nor practically sustainable. As the Nobel laureate Paul Crutzen 
has phrased it, humankind has entered a new phase in planetary history, the era of the "anthropocene". 
Consequently, any attempt to bring about change, whether on the micro or macro level or both, must 
take into account the complex history of development that lies behind the current situation. 
This article has examined some of the historical processes and events that contributed to the 
very development of a European ideology of dominance, which has had such profound impacts on our 
interconnected world. Based on Europe’s favourable situation in 1500, and framed by the scientific 
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15  The Venetian Arsenal represents one of the most paradigmatic early capitalist production structures in 
Europe. 
16  A European world economy is not a global economy. Arguing that Japan was integrated into the Euro-
pean economy around 1600 is hard to prove (although there was trade between Europe and Japan), whereas the 
Brazil and the Azores were certainly strongly integrated. 
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discoveries and the Reformation as central events, the ideology of domination over the natural en-
vironment took hold in the context of the competitive development of the European states system, the 
decline of Christianity as a total explanatory structure for human existence, the scientific turn of 
Cartesianism and the rise of capitalism to a self-replicating structure of rational choice. 
In addition to making an argument about the specific conditions and prerequisites that led to 
the institutionalisation of an ideology of domination and control over nature, this article also 
contributes to the larger endeavour of embedding political ecology research in its historic context, 
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Abstract: 
This article contributes to the broadening agenda of critical globalisation(s) research by analysing one 
of the most fundamental ideological foundations of the current global transformation in a historical 
perspective: the ideology of "domination over nature" that was implemented in Europe from 1500 
onwards. Humans have always shaped and altered their environment according to their needs and 
aspirations. However, it is the distinct ideology of mastery and domination over nature that underlines 
this unprecedented enterprise. An ideology in this context is understood as a codified justification for 
social practices, codified in concrete as well as highly abstract systems of rule. The question I seek to 
answer in this contribution is why Europe – a backward civilisation up to the late Middle Ages and the 
Renaissance – was the birthplace of the distinct ideology of mastery over nature, globalising itself 
through exploration, discovery, and trade to nearly every corner of the planet. 
 
Key words:  ideology of mastery, human-nature relations, ecological imperialism, historical political 
ecology 
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